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The Distributional Effects of Tax-Benefit Policies under 
New Labour: A Shapley Decomposition
*
 
Using counterfactual microsimulations, Shapley decompositions of time change in inequality 
and poverty indices make it possible to disentangle and quantify the relative effect of tax-
benefit policy changes, compared to all other effects including shifts in the distribution of 
market income. Using this approach also helps to clarify the different issues underlying the 
distributional evaluation of policy reforms. An application to the UK (1998-2001) confirms 
previous findings that inequality and depth of poverty would have increased under the first 
New Labour government, had important reforms like the extensions of income support and 
tax credits not been implemented. These reforms have also contributed to substantially 
reduce poverty among families with children and pensioners. 
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apply. 1 Introduction
For analysts and policy makers, it is crucial to know whether actual tax-bene￿t reforms have achieved
their objectives in terms of redistribution. A usual way to identify the impact of policy changes on
income distribution is to decompose inequality indices by income components, possibly isolating the role
of taxes or social transfers, and to repeat the assessment at di⁄erent points in time (before and after
important reforms). Decomposition by income types, as introduced and axiomatised by Shorrocks (1982),
has well-known limitations summarized in Shorrocks (1999). In particular, the contribution assigned to a
speci￿c factor is not always interpretable in an intuitively meaningful way (cf. Chantreuil and Trannoy,
1997). Moreover, constraints are often placed on the types of poverty and inequality indices which can be
used, some indices requiring the introduction of a vaguely de￿ned ￿ interaction￿term in order to maintain
the decomposition identity. Equally crucial for policy analyses, measuring the contribution of taxes
and transfers to overall inequality/poverty at di⁄erent points in time does not allow disentangling the
pure e⁄ect of policy changes from their interaction with the underlying population. For instance, social
assistance schemes may appear more redistributive because of their increased generosity or because of
automatic increase in welfare payments as unemployment rises.1
In this respect, microsimulation models have proven extremely useful over the past two decades (cf.
Atkinson, 2005). Indeed they allow us to construct counterfactuals to disentangle the pure e⁄ect of policy
changes from changes in the environment in which policy operates ￿in particular changes in market
income inequality possibly due to variations in unemployment rates, wage inequality, demographics,
etc. However, measures may be sensitive to the choice of indexation factor used in the "no reform"
counterfactual scenario. Results may also depend on the underlying population used to evaluate policy
change, either the base-period or the ￿nal-period data. This issue has been investigated in the literature
on tax progressivity.2 Yet it has received little attention by policy analysts, though results may be
sensitive to the choice made.3 An exception is the study of Clark and Leicester (2004) who carefully
investigate the distributional e⁄ect of policy changes over the 1980s and 1990s in the UK and provide an
extensive sensitivity analysis.
This paper attempts to clarify these issues by embedding policy evaluation in a formal framework
based on the Shapley decomposition. The change in the poverty or inequality measures is decomposed
1The approach sometimes referred to as the ￿ actual payments￿method is used by Jenkins (1995) and Goodman, Johnson
and Webb (1997) to analyse inequality trends in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s. Their ￿nding that the tax-bene￿t system
of the late 1980s was not less redistributive than that of the late 1970s is partly due to the fact that they do not account
for changes in the underlying market income distribution.
2Musgrave and Thin (1948) show that measures of progressivity (or redistributive power) do not only depend on the tax
structure and the average tax burden but also on the actual pre-tax income distribution. Recent analyses include Dardanoni
and Lambert (2002) and Lambert and Thoresen (2009).
3For instance, Thoresen (2004) extensively analyses the impact of tax changes on progressivity and redistribution in
Norway as assessed using base-period data. Adam and Wake￿eld (2005) analyse the distributional impact of tax-bene￿t
reforms implemented between 1997 and 2005 in the UK as assessed on end-period data.
1into three components: (i) the e⁄ect of changes in tax-bene￿t policy, (ii) the e⁄ect of adjusting tax-bene￿t
monetary parameters according to market income growth; and (iii) the e⁄ect of changes in market income
inequality (or more generally all the changes not directly linked to tax-bene￿t policies). Breaking down
factors (ii) and (iii) allows separating changes in underlying gross incomes into a growth component and a
redistribution component. It also provides a ￿ distributionally neutral￿backdrop against which the policy
e⁄ect (i) can be evaluated (cf. Callan et al., 2006, Bargain and Callan, 2008). The policy impact is
alternatively assessed on base-period and end-period data. Symmetry arguments also suggest that the
two alternative measures should be averaged (see Shorrocks, 1999, and Kolenikov and Shorrocks, 2005).
This leads to a third decomposition in which the (averaged) policy e⁄ect is the contribution associated
with the policy change in a two-way Shapley decomposition.
We apply the three decompositions to revisit the role of tax-bene￿t policies implemented in the UK
over 1998-2001. Interestingly, this corresponds to a period of economic boom, accompanied by an increase
in market inequality, as well as a time of signi￿cant increase in bene￿ts and tax credits under the ￿rst
New Labour government (1997-2001). Our main contribution is to quantify precisely the relative role
of policy changes on inequality/poverty trends. Importantly, key results are robust with respect to the
decomposition method. In line with previous studies, we ￿nd that inequality has remained stable or
slightly increased overall, but would have risen signi￿cantly without Labour￿ s reforms. We also extract
from the total policy e⁄ect the impact of the most salient policy developments of this period. The
extensions of the income support and of the family tax credit seem to be the most redistributive policies,
with substantial poverty reduction among pensioners and families with children.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the decomposition approach. Section 3
describes the data, the microsimulation model and the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Shapley Decomposition
2.1 Background
We ￿rst introduce some notation and terminology. We denote by household ￿ gross income￿or ￿ market
income￿the total amount of labour income, capital income and private pensions before taxes and bene￿ts.
￿ Disposable income￿is the household income that remains after payment of taxes/social contributions and
receipt of all transfers, as widely used to measure poverty and inequality.4 Matrix y describes the popu-
lation contained in the data, i.e. each row contains all the information about a given household (various
income sources and socio-demographic characteristics). Denote d the ￿ tax-bene￿t function￿transforming,
for each household, gross incomes and household characteristics into a certain level of disposable income.
4For our application to the UK, we consider that the link between contributions and the value of bene￿ts is loose enough
so that earnings-replacement incomes provided by the state (job seeker￿ s allowance, basic pension, disability bene￿ts) can
be treated as part of the redistribution function.
2Tax-bene￿t calculations depend also on a set of monetary parameters (e.g. maximum bene￿t amounts,
threshold level of tax brackets, etc.), denoted p. Thus, the distribution of disposable income is repre-
sented hereafter by di(pj;yl), for a hypothetical scenario with the underlying population of year l, the
tax-bene￿t parameters of year j and the tax-bene￿t structure of year i. In the empirical part, we are





distribution of disposable income for a given year or for counterfactual situations. Also, policy changes
under study possibly combine changes in policy structure d and changes in parameters p (the ￿ uprating
policy￿ ).
Hereafter, we shall consider the possibility of nominally adjusting income levels by the uprating
factor ￿1, i.e., the income growth rate between year 0 and year 1. That is, ￿1y0 retains the structural
characteristics of year 0 data (in particular the distribution of gross income) but adopts the nominal levels
prevailing in year 1. With this notation, we can easily represent counterfactual situations. For instance,
d1(p1;￿1y0) represents disposable incomes obtained by applying tax-bene￿t rules and parameters of year
1 on nominally adjusted data of year 0. This backdrop, where the new policy is evaluated while holding
the population constant, is used in the decomposition below. Symmetrically, we may need to evaluate
the distribution obtained with the initial policy applied to the new population. A measure d0(p0;y1)
would not be consistent since base-period parameters would be arti￿cially applied to end-period income
levels. For instance, previous tax band thresholds would be applied to new and possibly higher income
levels, thereby generating arti￿cial ￿ ￿scal drag￿ . Therefore, we need to construct counterfactuals where
tax-bene￿t parameters can be uprated using the same factor ￿1 as used to scale up the distribution of
gross income between period 0 and 1. Clearly, the nominally adjusted schedule, denoted ￿1p0, is not
identical to the actual set of parameters p1 as decided by the authorities. However, d0(￿1p0;y1) suggests
an interesting backdrop where the only policy change between years 0 and 1 is an uprating of money
parameters in line with income growth.
A useful property stems from these adjustments, namely the linear homogeneity of the tax-bene￿t
function:
di(￿pj;￿yl) = ￿di(pj;yl): (1)
It states that a simultaneous change in nominal levels of both incomes and parameters should not a⁄ect
the relative location of households in the distribution of disposable income. It is easily shown that this
property holds if the tax-bene￿t system is linear and continuous in p and y which is the case in many
countries (see Bargain and Callan, 2008, for an illustration). We shall test this property empirically for










which proves useful in what follows. We make a ￿nal remark about the zeros contained in the initial
income distribution y0. Those correspond to unemployed and inactive households without other resources
3than state transfers. In (2), welfare payments (in the parameter vector p0) are uprated by the same factor
￿1 as market incomes so that the relative position of these households does not decrease.
2.2 Decomposition











This change in the distribution of disposable income, as summarized by index I, can be decomposed into
the contribution of the change in the tax-bene￿t policy (￿ policy e⁄ect￿ ) and the contribution of changes
in the underlying gross income distribution (or any other e⁄ects not directly linked to policy changes).
The former e⁄ect corresponds to a shift from d0(p0;￿) to d1(p1;￿) while the latter is simply a move from
base year data y0 to ￿nal data y1. Thus the decomposition consists in a shift in data conditional on the
initial policy, followed by a change in policy evaluated on ￿nal data (decomposition I). Or, alternatively
and symmetrically, a change in policy evaluated on base year data, followed by a change in underlying
data conditional on the new policy (decomposition II).
As explained above, we cautiously apply nominally-adjusted tax-bene￿t parameters p0 to ￿nal income


































The ￿rst term captures the e⁄ect of the tax-policy change over the period conditional on ￿nal year data.
Conditional on the policy structure of year 0, and for nominal levels of year 1, the second term gauges the
change in market income inequality (and more generally, in the underlying population). Symmetrically,


































Here, the end-period system is evaluated on nominally-adjusted base-period data.
The primary objective of this paper is to quantify the relative e⁄ect of policy changes compared to
changes in market income distribution. In the above expressions, nominal adjustments naturally lead
to further decomposition of the change in income base into a growth component and a redistribution
component. This is reminiscent of some of the applications of decomposition procedures to the context of
countries in development or in transition. Datt and Ravallion (1992) and Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2005),
4among others, have studied the decomposition of changes in absolute poverty into the contribution of
income growth (holding inequality constant) and the contribution of income inequality (holding mean
income constant). In the present context, however, changes in market income levels and market income
inequality are expressed after transformation into disposable income via the tax-bene￿t function d(p;￿).
Further, the income growth component ￿the third term in (I) and (II) ￿corresponds to a uniform growth
in market income and in tax-bene￿t parameters (incl. earnings-replacement income for those with zero
market income). It disappears if the homogeneity property (2) holds.
As argued by Shorrocks (1999), the Shapley value procedure can be employed whenever one wishes
to assess the relative importance of the explanatory variables. In particular, the decomposition of a
poverty/inequality statistic I can be carried out by considering the marginal e⁄ect on I of eliminating
each of m contributory factors in sequence, and then assigning to each factor the average of its marginal
contributions in all possible elimination sequences.5 In our context, if the homogeneity property is veri￿ed,
the ￿ policy e⁄ect￿and the ￿ market income inequality e⁄ect￿under the Shapley decomposition are thus


















































In our empirical work, we aim to gauge the relative e⁄ect of policy change compare to the change
in market income inequality. Importantly for the robustness of the policy analysis, we examine the
sensitivity of the results to the choice of the decomposition, either the "end-weighted" measure (I), the
"base-period weighted" measure (II) or the averaged Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition.
2.3 Discussion









only capture the change in policy structure (d0 to d1) on income distribution. It also assesses the actual
uprating policy (shift from p0 to p1) against a scenario where parameters are adjusted in line with average
income growth (￿1p0). This calls for an extensive discussion.
The way tax brackets and welfare payments are uprated by governments can have important implica-
tions for income distribution and public spending in the long run. Sutherland et al. (2008) provide a very
extensive analysis of this question. Governments have many options to uprate tax-bene￿t parameters,
three of them being fairly standard: (1) no uprating, (2) uprating according to the level of price in￿ ation,
(3) uprating according to the level of earnings growth. With non-indexation of tax brackets in progressive
5This approach is used by Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982) to decompose inequality trends in the UK into the contri-
butions of subgroup population shares, subgroup mean incomes and subgroup inequalities. Jenkins and van Kerm (2005)
analyse inequality change in the UK in the 1980s and discuss the choice of weights used in the decomposition, either
base-period values, end-period values or the Shapley value (averaging of all contributions).
5systems, or price indexation when incomes rise faster than prices, the total number of tax payers (and
the number of higher-rate taxpayers) increases. This phenomenon of ￿ ￿scal drag￿or ￿ bracket creep￿must
a⁄ect the ￿nal distribution of disposable income (see Immervoll, 2005). With price indexation of welfare
payments when real income grows, those living on welfare fall further behind those receiving earnings and
relative poverty may increase. This phenomenon of ￿ bene￿t erosion￿tends to have larger distributional
e⁄ects ￿especially poverty e⁄ects ￿than ￿scal drag (cf. Sutherland et al., 2008).
So we may wish to further decompose the policy e⁄ect into the contributions of structural changes
and uprating policy respectively. However, these two components are usually intertwined in a way that
makes the distinction di¢ cult and, to some extent, arbitrary. For instance, a reduction in the number
of tax bands can be interpreted either as a structural change or as a particular nominal adjustment of
tax band thresholds. Another example, particularly relevant for the UK during the period under study,
is the introduction of the ￿ working family tax credit￿(WFTC) in 1999. This reform is often seen as an
important structural change while the WFTC has in fact kept the same structure as the previous family
credit. That is, the reform has mainly consisted in the increase in payment levels and especially some
changes in child increments (depending on the age of children). Even the decrease in the taper rate ￿i.e.,
an extension of the phasing-out of the transfer ￿can simply be seen as an increase in the income level at
which the payment is stopped (cf. Sutherland and Gutierrez, 2004, for a detailed exposition).
Importantly, the actual policy changes are gauged against a "no reform" backdrop d0(￿1p0;￿) where
tax-bene￿t parameters are uprated with income growth. This is a natural consequence of the decomposi-
tion suggested above. More generally, this benchmark is suggested by several authors as the appropriate
one for the purpose of evaluating the distributional e⁄ect of policies as compared to other changes in
underlying data. Indeed, it provides a "distributionally-neutral" backdrop (Callan et al., 2006, Suther-
land et al., 2008) or "constant progressivity" counterfactual (Clark and Leicester, 2004) against which
actual policy changes can be evaluated.6 For instance, bene￿t erosion when real income increases, as
described above, would not be captured by a no-reform scenario adjusted with price in￿ ation. Arguably,
distribution-neutrality is only one criterion amongst many. The actual objectives of a government are
more complex than mere redistribution and may actually include regressive policy changes. For instance,
bene￿t erosion may be politically smoother than direct cuts in bene￿ts when it comes to improving pub-
lic ￿nances. Notwithstanding, it seems interesting to provide policy makers with a gauge of the actual
distributional implications of general policy actions ￿and the chosen benchmark seems well-suited for
this purpose.
The philosophy behind alternatively no-reform scenarios is di⁄erent. The one based on price in￿ ation,
used in many policy analyses (e.g., Brewer et al., 2004, for the UK), is often justi￿ed on historical ground.
6The desirability of earnings-related adjustments is also suggested by actual uprating policies in Scandinavian countries
(and the Netherlands), generally regarded as ￿ best practice￿examples in terms of welfare provision. For instance, Denmark
has a uni￿ed and comprehensive uprating system where all bene￿ts and tax parameters are systematically indexed on annual
average earnings development.
6Yet Clark and Leicester (2004) show that it actually captures only part of the uprating practices of the
past decades in the UK.7 While the historical justi￿cation aims to guarantee some continuity in the
evaluation of policies, it must imply normative assumptions which have not been fully investigated.
For the sake of completeness, we take a look at alternative options within the present framework.
A ￿rst possibility is to uprate both data and parameters with price in￿ ation, denoted ￿1. Assuming























Since ￿1p0 represents a counterfactual policy where tax band thresholds and welfare payments have been
price-indexed, the second term potentially includes ￿scal drag / bene￿t erosion and cannot be interpreted
as a pure change in market income inequality. With such decomposition, we cannot quantify the respective
roles of policy changes and changes in market income. Instead, we keep on uprating data with average


































In this case, the last term does not vanish, even if homogeneity holds. This residual term captures the
distributional e⁄ect of a uniform income growth evaluated against a price-indexed system. It neces-
sarily generates some bene￿t erosion (and ￿scal drag) when gross incomes grow faster than prices. It



































Compared to (II), the policy e⁄ect is no longer evaluated as the departure from the true initial measure
of income distribution. In what follows, we compare these alternative decompositions to those based on
income-indexation.
7While key parameters in the income tax code have been price indexed, bene￿ts have been uprated with GDP prior
to 1979 and some welfare elements are explicitly income-linked in the recent period (e.g., child tax credit and the pension
credit under the second Labour government). Acknowledging this double historical trend, Clark and Leicester thus suggest
an alternative backdrop based on RPI uprating of tax parameters and GDP uprating of bene￿ts.
73 Empirical Application
3.1 Data and Simulations
The base and end period data are drawn from the Family Expenditure Surveys (FES) and contain 6,797
and 6,637 households respectively (see Sutherland and Gutierrez, 2004, for an extended description).8
The uprating factor ￿1, calculated as the growth rate of average gross income over the 1998-2001 period,
is 6:8%. It is computed as an average of all market incomes (incl. labour income, capital incomes and
private pensions).9 Price indexation ￿1 could be performed using the RPI, as traditionally used for the
UK. Yet the value over the period is 6:4%, which is too close to ￿1 for the decompositions I￿and II￿
using price-indexation to be di⁄erent from I and II. Since we want to explore the sensitivity of di⁄erent
methods of indexation, we make use of the much smaller CPI index over the period (3:3%), as used in
Callan et al. (2006).
Simulations are performed using the tax-bene￿t calculator EUROMOD. This microsimulation model
computes direct taxes and monetary transfers ￿and hence disposable income ￿for all the households of a
representative dataset (cf. Bargain, 2006 ed.). Note that the analysis below ignores in-kind bene￿ts and
uses the information contained in the data when taxes and bene￿ts cannot be simulated.10 We follow
the EUROSTAT recommended assumptions. That is, all measures are based on equivalised household
disposable income using the modi￿ed OECD scale; the poverty line is ￿xed at 60% of median equivalised
incomes.11
EUROMOD has been designed to compare tax-bene￿t systems across Europe. For this reason, it may
be seen as less accurate than national microsimulation models (for instance TAXBEN or POLIMOD in
the UK) for speci￿c studies at a country level. Yet the robustness of EUROMOD has been extensively
checked through numerous applications (e.g., in Bargain, 2006 ed.) and validation studies (cf. Mantovani
and Sutherland, 2003). In particular for the UK, validation of simulated elements of income is carried
out by Sutherland and Gutierrez (2004) both in relation to independent external sources and to output
from the national UK tax-bene￿t model POLIMOD.12 The only drawback with the EUROMOD module
8The choice of the period under investigation is driven by what is currently available for the UK module of EUROMOD.
Nevertheless, the 1998-2001 period is particularly interesting, as motivated in the introduction.
9Note that the decomposition requires the use of a unique factor on all types of incomes. If di⁄erentiated ￿ coe¢ cients
were used for each income source (e.g. labour versus capital income), the distribution of gross income would change, i.e.
I(￿1y0) 6= I(y0); while we actually want to hold it constant for the sake of the decomposition.
10This is in particular the case of child support (no data on absent parents), statutory sick pay and maternity pay (no
data on qualifying conditions), council tax (no data on property value or council tax band and no location information
below standard region), disabled persons tax credit and several disability allowances (insu¢ cient information on disability).
11The modi￿ed OECD scale has also replaced the McClements scale in some of the o¢ cial statistics produced in the
UK, in particular in those published by the Department for Work and Pensions since 2007. Brewer et al. (2004) note that
this switch re￿ects a widespread view that McClements does not give su¢ cient weight to the costs of very young children
relative to older children.
12External sources stem from the "Households Below Average Income" annual survey (published by the Department for
Work and Pensions and based on the Family Resources Survey), on ￿The E⁄ect of Taxes and Bene￿ts on Household Income￿
annual survey (published by the O¢ ce for National Statistics in Economic Trends and based on the FES and it past-2001
8for the UK is the use of the FES rather than the much larger Family Resource Survey (FRS). Clark and
Taylor (1999) actually ￿nd a greater degree of accuracy when using the FRS to measure inequality. In
what follows, we include measures of statistical inference for the main inequality/poverty indices.
More traditionally, small but systematic di⁄erences between survey-based and simulation-based results
are likely due to the approximations made in the latter. In particular for the UK, simulations do not
account for possible non-take-up of means-tested bene￿ts and tax credits, which must explain most of
the underestimation of poverty and inequality.13 We ￿nd a Gini of around 31 for the UK (30.9 for the
year 1998 and 31.1 for 2001), which is about 3% lower than ECHP-based values reported in Dennis and
Guio (2003) and 11% lower than ￿gures reported for 2001 by the Department for Work and Pensions
(based on the Family Resources Survey). These approximations are however not speci￿c to the present
study and also made in policy assessments based on national microsimulation models (see for instance
Clark and Leicester, 2004, or Adam and Wake￿eld, 2005, using TAXBEN).
3.2 Relative E⁄ect of Tax-bene￿t Policy Changes
The period under investigation almost coincides with the ￿rst term of the New Labour government
in the UK. It is characterized by an increased generosity of welfare payments, especially since 1999.
Income support for the elderly (now called ￿ minimum income guarantee￿ ) has been increased and has now
higher capital limits than for other claimants. Families with children also bene￿t from an increase in
income support and from the replacement of the family tax credit by the more generous WFTC. To limit
adverse e⁄ects of the WFTC, namely the possibility that employers o⁄set the net gain of the transfer by
lowering hourly wages, the government has also introduced a national minimum wage. In addition, a non-
refundable children￿ s tax credit has replaced the married couples allowance (except for elderly) and the
additional personal allowance. More minor changes in welfare include the introduction of a pensioner￿ s
annual winter fuel allowance and nominal adjustments of existing transfers (housing bene￿t, council tax
bene￿t, child bene￿t). On the tax side, structural policy changes include the abolition of the tax relief on
mortgage interest, the introduction of a 10% lower rate and the reduction in the standard rate (from 23%
to 22%) in the income tax schedule, the switch from a trigger to a slice structure of Employers￿social
insurance contributions. Finally, council taxes have been regularly raised above in￿ ation.14
The policy changes under New Labour have already been extensively analysed, in particular using the
national microsimulation models TAXBEN (e.g., Brewer et al. 2004) and POLIMOD (e.g., Sutherland,
2001). Our contribution here is simply to disentangle and quantify the relative tax-bene￿t policy e⁄ect
successor, the Expenditure and Food Survey) and on additional calculations conducted by the Institute for Fiscal Studies.
13This aspect is carefully investigated by Sutherland and Gutierrez (2004) who reconcile EUROMOD simulations with
o¢ cial ￿gures by imputing non-take-up rates. Hancock et al. (2003) discuss the di¢ culty to introduce take-up correction
within microsimulation. Hancock et al. (2004) emphasize the necessity to carry out speci￿c take-up modelling for each
instrument and to account for possible interactions (for instance, housing bene￿ts and income support).
14The average real increases in England and Wales was around 17% between 1997 and 2001. This is the fastest increase
of any major tax under Labour, although it remains a relatively small tax as it represents less than 5% of government
revenues. See Adam and Wake￿eld (2005) for an extensive analysis of its distributional implications.
9by applying the formal decompositions suggested above. Detailed results are shown in table 1 where we
report the various counterfactuals used in the decompositions, the overall change in inequality/poverty,
the homogeneity check, and complete results for decompositions I, II and the averaged Shorrocks-Shapley
decomposition. A battery of indicators is used to analyze precisely the di⁄erent e⁄ects on various parts
of the income distribution and to study poverty for di⁄erent demographic groups (families with children,
elderly, all others). In addition, table 2 provides standard errors for the main indices, focusing on both
initial and ￿nal years, total change, homogeneity test. Most importantly, 95% con￿dence intervals for
the tax-bene￿t policy e⁄ect according to the three main decompositions are reported.
First of all, we can compare the situation in base and end periods as reported by columns indexed
(0) and (4) in table 1. It turns out that inequality, as measured by the Gini and percentile ratios, does
not change much over time. According to table 2, the small increase in the Gini is not signi￿cant, nor
are the changes in percentile ratio; only the Atkinson with high inequality aversion (" = 1:25) indicates a
relatively worse o⁄situation for those in the lowest part of the distribution. This twist in the distribution
is also re￿ ected by a small, but non signi￿cant, increase in the FGT(2) poverty measure, which puts more
weights on those that fall well below the poverty line. The square poverty gap increases more markedly
for the working-age population without children ￿a likely re￿ ection of the fact that these households are
not a⁄ected by the increases in income support and family tax credit. Further, headcount poverty has
signi￿cantly decreased amongst families with children and, to a lesser extent, old-age households. Yet it
is not accompanied by a reduction in the depth of poverty for the latter.15 These results are overall in
line with Brewer et al. (2004): the number of poor decreases but the relative situation of the poorest ￿
especially among working-age households without children ￿deteriorates over the period.
We now decompose the role of policy changes versus other changes in explaining this overall trend.
Beforehand, we test the homogeneity property by reporting the third term of both decompositions I and








. It turns out that this di⁄erence is
not statistically di⁄erent from zero for all reported measures, which con￿rms that the property holds (cf.
table 2). As a result, we can concentrate on the decompositions into two terms only, i.e., policy e⁄ects
and changes in market income inequality. Decomposition results point towards a signi￿cant equalising
e⁄ect of policy changes in the UK over the period 1998-2001. Di⁄erences between methods, as reported
in table 1, are small. Table 2 shows that they are actually not signi￿cant ￿with the exception of the
Atkinson index (" = 1:25).16 Therefore, we can be con￿dent in the weight of the policy e⁄ect as measured
in these decompositions.
Policy change reduces inequality moderately and almost o⁄sets increased market income inequality
15As in Sutherland and Piachaud (2001), we ￿nd that (relative) child poverty decreases by a bit more than 29% (about
one million children). The policy change has done more than moving children from just below the line above it. It has also
reduced the intensity of poverty and the situation of the poorest. A speci￿c assessment of child poverty under the ￿rst New
Labour government is provided by Sutherland and Piachaud (2001), Dickens and Ellwood (2003) and Brewer et al. (2003).
16This index is measured with much less precision when using the end-period data, which leads to an imprecise gauge of
the policy e⁄ect under decomposition I.
10according to most measures. Without policy e⁄ects, inequality as measured by the Gini would have
increased by around 1.7 points (close to the 1.5 ￿gure reported in Brewer et al., 2004). The policy e⁄ect
itself reduces the Gini by around 1.5 points (close to the 1.4 points reported in Clark and Leicester,
2004). However, this overall trend hides a more complex pattern when looking at the lower part of the
distribution especially. The increase in market income inequality as measured by the Atkinson index
with high inequality aversion is very large, only partly compensated by policy changes. The signi￿cant
decrease in the headcount ratio is entirely due to the policy e⁄ect overall and is driven in particular by
poverty reduction among children and the elderly. The decrease in FGT(1) and FGT(2) indices due to
policy changes is counteracted by changes in market income distribution overall. In contrast, the depth
of child poverty is not a⁄ected by changes in market income and strongly decreases in total in response
to policy changes ￿this likely re￿ ects the expansion of income support and family tax credits. While
changes in market income deteriorate the relative position of poor pensioners, reforms seem to move a
large number of them just above the poverty line but do not manage to improve the relative situation of
the poorest ones.
Figure 1 depicts the change in the overall distribution by plotting the di⁄erences between Lorenz
curves in base and end periods as well as the decompositions I and II. The slight rise in inequality since
1998 essentially re￿ ects what has happened at the extremes of the income distribution. Precisely, for both
the richest and poorest, income growth is increasing with income. Indeed the di⁄erence between 2001 and
1998 Lorenz curves (￿ total change￿ ) is negative, indicating that the Lorenz curve has moved downward
(i.e., further from the equality line) at these extremes. Con￿dence intervals (not represented) show that
the total change is not signi￿cant, except for the ￿rst decile where the Lorenz curve has signi￿cantly
moved away from the equality line. However, both the policy e⁄ect and the change in market income
inequality are signi￿cant all along the distribution, with the exception of the top decile for the policy
e⁄ect.
Table 3 shows that uprating tax-bene￿t parameters with price in￿ ation rather than income growth
does not a⁄ect the relative weight of the policy e⁄ect much (standard errors are . The residual term is
actually not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for the reported inequality measures. It is however positive
and signi￿cant for headcount poverty, re￿ ecting the bene￿t erosion due to price-indexed parameters (and
the fact that ￿ is larger than ￿). Another di⁄erence between no-reform counterfactuals is the way they
a⁄ect tax revenues. It may be argued that counterfactuals that signi￿cantly a⁄ect the ￿scal position of
the government are not plausible. Indeed, a counterfactual which generates a lot of redistribution ￿e.g.,
in which bene￿ts have been uprated more than income ￿would also cost much more to the state. Thus
we calculate the di⁄erence between net tax revenue from the actual 2001 system (evaluated on base year
data) and that from the income-indexed and price-indexed 1998 systems (using decompositions II and II￿
respectively). We ￿nd a decrease of £1.08 bn and £1.33 bn in tax revenue respectively. This means that
the actual reforms have left the government slightly worse o⁄ (and the household sector better o⁄) than
in our counterfactual world ￿a re￿ ection of the redistributive policies of the period. As expected, this
11e⁄ect is larger in the situation where bene￿ts are uprated ￿ only￿by price in￿ ation. The income-adjusted
scenario is therefore slightly more revenue-neutral. Note however that distributional neutrality more than
revenue neutrality was our primary objective when designing decompositions I and II.
Finally, table 4 provides a few additional simulations aimed to identify which particular policies are
responsible for the signi￿cant overall redistributive e⁄ect. For this exercise, we simply use the 2001
system/population as the reference point, and simulate the change in inequality/poverty in case some of
the policies are taken back to what they were in 1998. The second column shows the combined e⁄ect
of all the 1998 policies ￿which is nothing else than the policy e⁄ect of decomposition I. When policies
did not exist in the 1998 system (childcare tax credit, minimum wage), the exercise consists simply
in cancelling these policies. For the others, we apply the 1998 version of the policy while adjusting
monetary parameters to 2001 using ￿1. Note that the Shapley value method could in principle be
extended to explain the contribution of these di⁄erent policies. This is however made di¢ cult by the
fact that each policy interacts with the rest of the system. This partly explains why the cumulated e⁄ect
of the di⁄erent policies does not sum up to the total policy e⁄ect.17 While the relative contributions of
the di⁄erent policies cannot be exactly quanti￿ed, our simulations give nonetheless a fair idea of their
relative in￿ uences. It comes that the extension of the income support and the replacement of the family
tax credit by the WFTC in 1999 have been the most in￿ uential reforms as far as progressive e⁄ects
are concerned. The former reform accounts for half of the poverty reduction amongst pensioners while
both reforms account for most of the decline in child poverty. The child tax credit is targeted mainly to
middle-income families and pushes up the mean/median income without improving the situation of the
worst o⁄.18 Other policies play a more minor role.
4 Conclusion
Relying on microsimulated counterfactual distributions, we decompose the time change in inequality/poverty
into the contribution directly due to tax-bene￿t policy changes and the contribution of other factors such
as changes in market income inequality. The method is applied to inequality/poverty changes in the
UK over the period 1998-2001. Results con￿rm that the redistributive measures of the Labour govern-
ment have reduced the increase in inequality that would have occurred otherwise. These reforms have
contributed to a signi￿cant drop in poverty among children and the elderly.
Counterfactual distributions can be conditional on base period data, end period data, or an average
of these two contributions. This last measure corresponds to the Shapley value method as reinterpreted
by Shorrocks (1999). Results do not reveal a particularly large sensitivity to the population at use
to evaluate policy changes, which con￿rms previous sensitivity analysis by Clark and Leicester (2004)
17For inequality measures of the whole distribution (like the Gini), this is also explained by the simple fact that the
di⁄erent policies a⁄ect di⁄erent parts of the distribution.
18Indeed, this is a reduction to tax liability that is not refunded to non-taxpayers so that low income families are not
eligible; those with high income are not eligible either since the credit is tapered away.
12for the UK. This is somehow reassuring for the many analyses using the "base weighted" measure of
policy impact as a ￿rst approximation, in particular when evaluating budget propositions for coming
years. Yet it is not sure that this result can be generalised to all countries and to all types of income
distribution measures. We have encountered more imprecise assessment of the Atkinson index with high
inequality aversion when using end-period data. Also, results by Bargain and Callan (2008) show that
the contribution of the policy e⁄ect to changes in headcount poverty in Ireland over the second half of
the 1990s is signi￿cantly di⁄erent depending on the decomposition at use.
Results for the UK are also robust to the choice of backdrop used to evaluate the policy e⁄ect.
Rather than the price-indexation benchmark used in most policy analyses, a scenario where all tax-
bene￿t parameters are adjusted in line with mean income growth seems appropriate when gauging the
distributional e⁄ect of reforms. Yet the normative judgments incorporated in these di⁄erent benchmarks
require further investigation.
Finally, the present analysis has ignored behavioural responses. Future research should attempt to
integrate those, and in particular the modelling of labour supply, into the decomposition framework.19
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15Table 1: Decomposing Changes in Income Distribution over Time
data year: 0 0 1 0 1
uprated to: 1 1
policy year: 0 0 0 1 1
uprated to: 1 1
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 30.9 30.9 32.5 29.3 31.1 0.3 0.0 -1.3 1.6 -1.6 1.8 -1.5 1.7
Atkinson 0.5 7.6 7.6 8.6 6.9 8.0 0.3 0.0 -0.6 1.0 -0.7 1.1 -0.7 1.0
Atkinson 1.25 17.7 17.7 21.8 16.2 20.7 3.0 0.0 -1.1 4.1 -1.6 4.5 -1.3 4.3
P90/P10 4.0 4.0 4.3 3.7 3.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.3 -0.3 0.3 -0.4 0.3
P90/P50 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
P50/P10 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.9 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1
Total poverty
FGT0 (%) 17.5 17.4 17.4 15.0 15.0 -2.4 0.0 -2.4 0.0 -2.5 0.1 -2.5 0.0
FGT1 (%) 3.1 3.1 3.6 2.5 2.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 0.5 -0.6 0.5
FGT2 (%) 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.8 1.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.3
Child poverty
FGT0 (%) 24.2 24.2 23.2 17.5 17.0 -7.1 0.00 -6.1 -1.0 -6.7 -0.5 -6.4 -0.7
FGT1 (%) 3.8 3.8 3.9 2.3 2.4 -1.4 0.00 -1.6 0.1 -1.5 0.1 -1.5 0.1
FGT2 (%) 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.6 -0.4 0.00 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 0.0
Poverty age>60
FGT0 (%) 19.7 19.7 22.3 15.5 18.3 -1.5 0.0 -4.0 2.6 -4.2 2.8 -4.1 2.7
FGT1 (%) 3.0 3.0 4.0 1.8 2.9 0.0 0.0 -1.1 1.1 -1.1 1.1 -1.1 1.1
FGT2 (%) 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.5 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 0.4
Other poor
FGT0 (%) 12.5 12.5 11.8 13.2 12.2 -0.3 0.0 0.4 -0.7 0.7 -1.1 0.6 -0.9
FGT1 (%) 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.0 3.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
FGT2 (%) 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.6 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4
Contribution of child poverty to total poverty (%)
FGT0 (%) 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.29 0.27 -0.08 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03
FGT1 (%) 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.19 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04
FGT2 (%) 0.27 0.27 0.19 0.21 0.13 -0.14 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08
Contribution of old age poverty to total poverty (%)
FGT0 (%) 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.05
FGT1 (%) 0.27 0.27 0.32 0.21 0.28 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.05 -0.07 0.08 -0.05 0.06
FGT2 (%) 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.19 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.05 -0.09 0.08 -0.07 0.06
(4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (1)-(0)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the modified OECD scale. The poverty line is 60% of the median equivalized income. Gini, Atkinson index and FGT poverty




























16Table 2: Statistical Inference
Gini 30.9 31.1 0.3 0.0 [ -2.1 ; -0.6 ] [ -2.2 ; -1.0 ] [ -2.1 ; -0.8 ]
(0.21) (0.27) (0.34) (0.30)
Atkinson 0.5 7.6 8.0 0.3 0.0 [ -1.6 ; 0.3 ] [ -1.2 ; -0.2 ] [ -1.4 ; 0.0 ]
(0.19) (0.33) (0.38) (0.27)
Atkinson 1.25 17.7 20.7 3.0 0.0 [ -4.5 ; 2.2 ] [ -2.6 ; -0.5 ] [ -3.5 ; 0.9 ]
(0.38) (1.23) (1.29) (0.53)
P90/P10 4.0 3.9 -0.1 0.0 [ -0.5 ; -0.3 ] [ -0.4 ; -0.2 ] [ -0.5 ; -0.2 ]
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
P90/P50 2.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 [ -0.1 ; 0.0 ] [ -0.1 ; 0.0 ] [ -0.1 ; 0.0 ]
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
P50/P10 2.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 [ -0.2 ; -0.1 ] [ -0.2 ; -0.1 ] [ -0.2 ; -0.1 ]
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
FGT0(%) 17.4 15.0 -2.5 0.0 [ -3.7 ; -1.1 ] [ -3.8 ; -1.2 ] [ -3.8 ; -1.2 ]
(0.47) (0.46) (0.66) (0.67)
FGT1(%) 3.1 2.9 -0.1 0.0 [ -1.0 ; -0.2 ] [ -0.9 ; -0.3 ] [ -1.0 ; -0.2 ]
(0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17)
FGT2(%) 1.0 1.1 0.1 0.0 [ -0.5 ; 0.1 ] [ -0.3 ; 0.0 ] [ -0.4 ; 0.1 ]
(0.07) (0.1) (0.12) (0.1)
Shapley Decompo II Decompo I




















































Tax-benefit policy effect (I)
Market income inequality (I)
Tax-benefit policy effect (II)
Market income inequality (II)
Total change
Figure 1: Decomposition of the Shift in the Lorenz Curve
17Table 3: Alternative Nominal Adjustments of Tax-Bene￿t Parameters in the ￿ No Reform￿Counterfactual
Inequality
Gini -1.3 1.6 -1.6 1.6 0.2 -1.6 1.8 -1.8 1.8 0.2
Atkinson 0.5 -0.6 1.0 -0.8 1.0 0.1 -0.7 1.1 -0.8 1.1 0.1
Atkinson 1.25 -1.1 4.1 -1.4 4.0 0.3 -1.6 4.5 -1.9 4.5 0.3
P90/P10 -0.4 0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.1
P90/P50 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0
P50/P10 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0
Total poverty
FGT0 (%) -2.4 0.0 -3.0 -0.2 0.7 -2.5 0.1 -3.2 0.1 0.7
FGT1 (%) -0.6 0.5 -0.8 0.5 0.2 -0.6 0.5 -0.8 0.5 0.2
FGT2 (%) -0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.1
Child poverty
FGT0 (%) -6.1 -1.0 -6.8 -1.8 1.4 -6.7 -0.5 -8.1 -0.5 1.4
FGT1 (%) -1.6 0.1 -1.9 0.1 0.4 -1.5 0.1 -1.9 0.1 0.4
FGT2 (%) -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.1
Poverty age>60
FGT0 (%) -4.0 2.6 -4.8 2.6 0.7 -4.2 2.8 -4.9 2.8 0.7
FGT1 (%) -1.1 1.1 -1.2 1.1 0.1 -1.1 1.1 -1.3 1.1 0.1
FGT2 (%) -0.4 0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 0.4 0.0
Other poor
FGT0 (%) 0.4 -0.7 0.0 -0.7 0.3 0.7 -1.1 0.4 -1.1 0.3
FGT1 (%) 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
FGT2 (%) 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0
Measures are based on equivalized income using the modified OECD scale. The poverty line is 60% of the median equivalized income. Gini, Atkinson index and FGT poverty


















































Gini 31.1 -1.3 -0.5 -0.9 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -1.2
Atkinson 0.5 8.0 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5
Atkinson 1.25 20.7 -1.1 -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -1.0
P90/P10 3.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
P90/P50 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
P50/P10 1.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Total poverty
FGT0 (%) 15.0 -2.4 0.4 -1.1 0.1 -0.8 -0.2 -1.8
FGT1 (%) 2.9 -0.6 0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.6
FGT2 (%) 1.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
Child poverty
FGT0 (%) 17.0 -6.1 0.3 -2.6 0.2 -3.3 -0.3 -5.7
FGT1 (%) 2.4 -1.6 0.0 -1.2 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -1.8
FGT2 (%) 0.6 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.5
Old age poverty
FGT0 (%) 18.3 -4.0 0.4 -1.9 0.1 0.0 0.2 -1.6
FGT1 (%) 2.9 -1.1 0.1 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7





change if back to
Measures are based on equivalized income using the modified OECD scale. The poverty line is 60% of the median equivalized income. Gini, Atkinson index
and FGT poverty measures are multiplied by 100. Simulations are based on 2001 data.
19